






















In Nigeria, as is elsewhere in the world, the drivers of shrinking civic space are not static. They 
shift with the times. During the military regime, civil society organizations (CSOs) as well as vocal 
critics of government encountered heightened repression and brutality in the hands of the then 
ruling junta. The era was characterised by the indiscriminate arrests and incarceration of activists, 
the numerous incidents of extrajudicial killings—such as the state-ordered execution of Ken Saro 
Wiwa, or the assassination of democracy campaigner, Kudirat Abiola—or the enactment of 
plenteous decrees that ousted the constitution. These incidents, and many more, are sad 
reminders of those dark days when the country’s civic space was completely closed.  
The handover to democratically-elected civilian governments beginning from 1999 brought some 
respite, restoring the supremacy of the constitution and civic freedoms. Democracy, however, 
brought with it newer drivers and threats to the civic space. This time around, governmental 
restrictions on civic freedoms were reframed around the objective of protecting national security 
or national interest.  The national security mantra gained more traction following the episodic 
skirmishes between regions and the rise of global terrorism, especially the onslaught of insurgent 
groups like Boko Haram in some parts of the country. Because this standard is subjective and 
gives state actors a wide discretion to determine what threatens national security, that 
discretionary power was often exercised arbitrarily in ways that narrowed the civic space.   
More recently, the COVID-19 pandemic, is propelling another shift from national security to health 
emergency response, reconfiguring the fault lines of individual and state accountability. While it 
is generally agreed that coronavirus pandemic comes within the definition of a clear and present 
danger to public safety, entitling states to invoke derogation measures (which often restrict civil 
liberties) in order to avert further danger to the public, local and international monitors of the civic 
space have documented several incidents where repressive emergency measures have been 
adopted for reasons not related to containing the health crisis. This baseline report sheds some 
light on the historical trajectory of the Nigerian civic space, particularly before and post-COVID, 
highlighting the emerging constraints and disruptions to political systems, and their consequential 
effects on the spaces for civil society and democratic engagement in the country.  
Governance History and Context of Nigeria 
The area known as Nigeria, today, emerged in 1914, following Lord Frederick Lugard’s 
amalgamation1 of the numerous ancient civilizations in the southern and northern protectorates 
of Nigeria, for easy colonial administration. Last October 12, Nigeria marked the 60th anniversary 
of its political independence from the British colonial rule. The very first post-independence federal 
and regional elections of 1964 and 1965 respectively kicked off on a tumultuous note, punctuated 
by incidents of violence, ethnic rivalry, electoral malpractices and boycotts. A military coup in 1966 
rudely interrupted that brief democratic experiment, paving the way for the culture of dialogue and 
compromise – which democracy represents – to disappear. In quick succession, the country 
witnessed coup after coup,3 dotted with very short intervals of democratic experimentation until 
May 1999.  
 
In the 1960s, agriculture contributed about 70% of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and 
accounted for about 90% of foreign earnings and federal government revenue. The country 
produced and exported agroproduce ranging from cocoa, cotton, palm oil, palm kernel, 
groundnuts, and rubber. In the days of agrarian economy, the northern part of the country was 
 
1 Before the amalgamation, Nigeria became a British Protectorate in January1901 
2 Nigeria gained independence on October 1, 1960. 




the leading hub of commercial agricultural production. The era of agricultural boom was short-
lived in the 60s, and was brusquely replaced with crude oil in the mid-1970s. Nigeria suffered 
huge economic and social setbacks as a direct result of the militarization of governance. 
Agriculture, the mainstay of the national economy during the pre- and post-Independence era was 
abandoned following the oil boom of the 1970s and the enormous foreign exchange inflows that 
came with it. This occasioned over-dependence on oil exports while the non-oil sectors gradually 
slipped into extinction. Considering that the country was then still in its infancy, lacking 
administrative and self-governing capacities, the 1970s was primarily a period of mistakes, trial-
and-error decision-making and learning-on-the-job opportunity for the political leadership. The 
country paid a price for this.  
 
With a land mass of 923, 768 square kilometres and a population of more than 200 million people, 
Nigeria is abundantly endowed with natural resources which include reserves of crude oil and 
natural gas, coal, tar sands and renewable energy resources such as hydro, fuelwood, solar, wind 
and biomass. Following the discovery of crude oil in commercial quantities in 1956, and the 
commencement of oil production in 1958, oil has continued to play a major role in Nigerian 
economy.  The production of low sulphur content, light crude oils - Antan Blend, Bonny Light, 
Bonny Medium, Brass Blend, Escravos Light, Forcados Blend, IMA, Odudu Blend, Pennington 
Light, Qua-Iboe Light and Ukpokiti4  make up to 85 percent of the Nigerian government’s revenue 
and 96% of the country’s export earnings.5 Along with the economic benefits from robust oil 
production also came three major problematic issues: environmental degradation, financial 
mismanagement, resource control politics, opening the doors to recurrent social conflicts. The 
impact of oil production on the environment is one of the most explosive sources of conflict in 
Nigeria. 
 
Nigeria is a multicultural nation with more than 250 ethnic groups and languages. Christianity, 
Islam and traditional worship are the three predominant religions, with a higher concentration of 
Christians in the South and Muslims in the north. The plurality of cultures and religions that exists 
in Nigeria is so seamlessly woven into the national political and social topography to the extent 
that Nigerians officially identify themselves first, by their ethnic groups; secondly, by their state of 
origin before affirming their Nigerian nationality as a third-level form of identification. 
Constitutional6, legislative and public policy provisions legitimize this three-way identity regime 
initially designed to protect ethnic minorities from the threat of extinction and also prevent the 
predominance of persons from specific ethnic groups in political office representation. As with 
most multicultural societies, the country’s heterogeneous trait remains both a considerable asset 
on one hand, and on the other, a source of persistent tension among the constituent groups. 
Nigeria’s history is replete with episodic skirmishes and fractured relationships, strained along 
ethnic, cultural and religious lines. Some of the conflicts have antecedents in old animosities, but 
many were resource-driven, spurred by perceptions of unequal distribution of government 
resources.7 
 
Despite having a federal structure, the constituent units lack total control of the use and 
management of natural resources in their domain. Instead, benefits from natural resources are 
centrally-controlled, and shared among states in accordance with a statutorily-defined allocation 
formula. The 1960 and 1963 Constitutions granted fiscal autonomy to the constituent units, but 
 
4 http://www.nnpcgroup.com/  
5 United States Energy Information Administration (EIA), 2013 
6 Section 14(3) of the 1999 Constitution states that the composition of the government of the federation or any of its agencies shall be 
carried out in such a manner as to reflect the federal character of Nigeria; Section 147 (3) provides for indigenity status of citizens, and 
as a criterion for appointing ministers into the federal cabinet.  




this was reversed in 1966, and has remained so, till this day. Accordingly, the control and 
distribution of natural resource benefits has continually fanned the flames of political crisis in 
Nigeria. Although multinational giants such as Shell, Chevron, Mobil, Elf, Agip and Texaco, among 
others, have successfully effected exploration and exploitation of the Niger Delta region’s wealth 
of natural resources for several decades, the oil-rich region remains one of the poorest and least-
developed parts of the country.  For the man in the Niger Delta where Nigeria’s oil wealth is 
sourced from, the current resource-sharing arrangement is widely viewed as inequitable and 
inconsistent with all known rules of natural justice and good conscience. These perceptions, in no 
small measure add to the list of threats undermining the civic space and hindering the 
achievement of peaceful coexistence in Nigeria. The activities of militant and resistance 
movements challenging the oppressive levels of poverty and environmental degradation in the 
region continue to provoke tensions and contentious political debates about resource control as 
well as a new formula for allocating resources. 
 
Nigerian Legal System 
 
Nigeria’s 1999 Constitution sits at the apex of all the laws in Nigeria, and to that extent, any 
federal, state or customary law that contravenes constitutional provisions shall be voided. 
Comparable to the United States, Nigeria operates federal and state legal systems. The 36 states, 
including the Federal Capital Territory (FCT) Abuja, make up the Nigerian federation. Legislative 
powers shared between federal and state governments confer authority on the federal legislature 
to make laws that apply throughout the entire federation while the states’ houses of assemblies 
can make laws that apply in their respective states.  
 
In other words, special courts (called the Federal High Court) established to enforce federal laws 
exercise jurisdiction throughout the entire country on a number of enumerated issues.1 The 
Constitution empowers every state to establish its own sets of laws and courts to interpret and 
enforce them. Customary laws—such as the Sharia laws and a host of native customs—also 
apply in different localities with the country. Customary laws vary from place to place, especially 
among ethnic groups. Special courts called “Area Courts” in northern Nigeria, and “Customary 
Courts” in Southern Nigeria, established pursuant to the various state edicts, are empowered to 
administer them in accordance with the contextual peculiarities of each locality. Appeals against 
the decision of the customary courts lie to the Customary Courts of Appeal of various states. 
These federal, state and customary laws make up Nigeria’s legal system.  
 
Supreme judicial powers are vested in the appellate courts strategically spread across the six (6) 
geo-political zones and on the Supreme Court. Parties aggrieved by the judicial determinations 
at the various states’ and federal courts can appeal against or approach the appellate courts for 
a judicial review. Except the appellate courts set aside their own decisions, or overrule 
themselves, their decisions, especially that of the Supreme Court are final. Consistent with the 
legal doctrine of stare decisis, the decisions of these higher courts bind all lower courts. 
 
The Civic Space: Definitions and Scope Under Nigerian Law 
The term, “civic space” is often used to describe those human rights which facilitate the ability of 
individuals and groups to participate in the polity and governance of their country. As an author 
explained, the civic space (that is the freedom and means to speak, access information, 
associate, organise, and participate in public decision-making) is essential to the healthy 




governance and social justice.8 From this definition, it can be inferred that certain constitutionally-
protected rights enable a free civic space, and those sets of rights are equally implicated when 
the civic space is repressed, obstructed or closed. Principal among these are rights to access 
information, the rights to free expression, assembly and association.  
These afore-mentioned freedoms are interconnected, and fully enshrined in Chapter IV of the 
Nigerian 1999 Constitution (as amended). They are so interconnected that the deprivation of one 
is often a trigger for the violation of the other rights. Precisely because of the interconnectedness 
of these constitutional guarantees, they bring the civic space to life by facilitating engagement 
among citizens themselves and between citizens and the government. In effect, every citizen is 
a recognized participant in the civic space arena and can play a role in the political, economic and 
social life of the country. (SPACES FOR CHANGE [S4C]: 2020)9. The freedom of expression 
(protected under Section 39(1) of the 1999 Constitution of Nigeria) guarantees the right of citizens 
to air their views, engage in dialogues and also express dissent on any issue through any 
communication channel of choice. The right to access information and press freedoms are 
concomitant to this right. Closely intertwined with the freedom of expression are the association 
and assembly freedoms (Section 40 of the 1999 Constitution) which permit citizens to form and 
belong to any group for the propagation of their thoughts and ideas, or belong to any political 
party of choice, hold and disseminate political ideologies. Civic spaces are impacted when 
limitations are placed on citizen’s rights, constraining their ability to organize, speak and assemble 
freely, making interaction between themselves and with other state and non-state actors difficult. 
THE NIGERIAN CIVIC SPACE: LONG BEFORE COVID-19 EMERGED 
Beginning from 2015 when Nigeria witnessed another democratic changeover in its political 
leadership, the civic space has been shrinking so rapidly, engendering a climate of fear and 
uncertainty in the country. (OHAERI V.I: 2017).10 As of August 2020, the database of closing civic 
spaces in Nigeria—www.closingspaces.org—recorded 252 incidents of crackdowns on the civic 
space, with the primary targets being dissenting voices, vocal critics of government, protesters, 
journalists, bloggers and human rights defenders challenging impunity, official corruption and 
human rights abuses.  In particular, Dadiyata, Agba Jalingo, IG Wala, Omoyele Sowore, James 
Abiri, Ambrose Nwaogwugwu, Audu Maikori and many others have been arrested, forcedly 
kidnapped, detained, slammed with phantom charges, prosecuted and/or imprisoned. One year 
after, the whereabouts of popular social critic, Mr Idris, popularly known as Dadiyata,11 is still 
unknown after he was abducted by unidentified assailants who seized him from his residence in 
Barnawa neighbourhood of Kaduna State.  
Consistent with the increasing contraction of the spaces for civic action, Nigeria scored 36.5 score 
in the press freedom index for 2019, a significant decline from its 49.8 score in 2007. (Nigeria - 
Press Freedom Index: 2019).12 That same year, Nigeria ranked 120 out of 180 countries reviewed 
 
8 Carmen Malena, Transparency & Accountability Initiative, Improving the Measurement of Civic Space, 2015, 
https://www.transparency-initiative.org/archive/wp-content/uploads/2015/05/TAI-Civic-Space-Study-v13-
FINAL.pdf 
9 SPACES FOR CHANGE, Database of Closing Civic Spaces in Nigeria: An Independent Review, August 2020. 
Please see https://spacesforchange.org/database-on-closing-civic-spaces-in-nigeria-an-independent-review/ 
10 Victoria Ibezim-Ohaeri, Confronting Closing Civic Spaces in Nigeria, Issue 26, SUR International Journal on 
Human Rights,   September 2017: page 1; https://sur.conectas.org/en/confronting-closing-civic-spaces-in-nigeria/  
11 Closing Spaces Database, Allegedly Kidnapped for Talking Too Much: Nearly a Year After, Nigerian Authorities ‘Unaware’ 
of Abducted Critic, Dadiyata's Whereabouts: https://closingspaces.org/incident/dadiyata-nearly-a-year-after-nigerian-authorities-
unaware-of-abducted-critics-whereabouts/ 




for press freedom, another dip from its 111 out of 180 ranking in 2015. Likewise, CIVICUS 
downgraded Nigeria from ‘obstructed’ to ‘repressed’ in its People Power Under Attack 2019 
report.13  The compilation of evidence presented by the local and international civic space trackers 
such as the Closing Spaces Database, the Press Freedom Index and the Civicus Monitor, all 
point to rapidly backsliding civic freedoms in the country.  
Under the military rule, journalists and activists were the major targets of government crackdowns. 
Advancements in digital technology have widened the umbrella of activism, allowing new entrants 
like bloggers, media influencers, freelance writers, including ordinary citizens to have greater 
access to online and offline spaces for civic action. Consequently, the internet and social media 
easily handed citizens a limitless tool for expression and democratic participation, expanding the 
civic space beyond the traditional media outlets, the streets and town halls. On the other hand, 
the ever-expanding spaces for citizen-state engagement also widened the dragnet of targets of 
governmental crackdowns. As digital technology is expanding the frontiers of civic action, so also 
has the scope of government restrictions widened, extending its claws to the new entrants whose 
actions make governments uncomfortable and subject them to greater scrutiny. [S4C:2020].14 
• The nature of governmental restrictions 
A study categorised governmental restrictions into three, namely: (1) restrictive legislations, (2) 
overbroad application of existing laws and (3) non-legal restrictions taking the form of shaming, 
negative labelling and including the outright proscription of the activities of targeted groups.15 The 
categories are not exhaustive, but have been rehashed because of the sharp distinctions drawn 
between the drivers and impacts of civic space contractions, shining a bright light on how 
unacceptable these restrictions are.  
- Restrictive legislations 
Since 2014, a tidal wave of legislations containing provisions that have enormous potential to 
shrink the civic space have been introduced in Nigeria’s state and federal legislatures. Notable 
among them are the Non-Governmental Organizations Regulatory Bill (NGO Bill),16 the Protection 
from Internet Falsehood and Manipulation Bill 201917 (also known as the Social Media Bill) and 
National Commission for the Prohibition of Hate Speeches Bill 201918—popularly known as the 
Hate Speech and Social Media Bills. The Social Media Bill sponsored by Senator Mohammed 
Sani seeks to prohibit the digital transmission of false statements and empowered law 
enforcement departments (the Nigerian Police Force) to order the internet service provider to 
disable access to users in the online location that false communication emanated from. Likewise, 
the Hate Speech sponsored by Senator Aliyu Sabi Abdullahi criminalized various form of 
expressions that could stir up ethnic hatred and equally make it possible to sentence to death by 
 
13 CIVICUS, People Power Under Attack, December 2019. Please see 
https://civicus.contentfiles.net/media/assets/file/GlobalReport2019.pdf 
14 SPACES FOR CHANGE, August 2020, ibid.  
15 15 Victoria Ibezim-Ohaeri, Confronting Closing Civic Spaces in Nigeria, Issue 26, SUR International Journal on Human Rights,   
September 2017: page 7; https://sur.conectas.org/en/confronting-closing-civic-spaces-in-nigeria/  




17 SPACES FOR CHANGE: Legal analysis of the Proposed Protection from Internet Falsehoods, Manipulations and Other 
Related Matters Bill, 2019: https://closingspaces.org/legal-analysis-of-the-proposed-protection-from-internet-falsehoods-
manipulations-and-other-related-matters-bill-2019/  





hanging anybody convicted of spreading hate speech. Following the tradition of other NGO-
targeted legislative proposals, the Civil Society Regulatory Commission Bill 2020 gives ‘incidental 
powers’ to the Corporate Affairs Commission to do anything which is calculated to facilitate the 
performance of the Commission’s functions and general duties, including without prejudice, direct 
specified action to be taken or direct application of a civil society’s property. 
At the state level, the State Houses of Assembly of the six North-east states of Adamawa, Bauchi, 
Borno, Yobe, Gombe and Taraba introduced a bill in November 2019, to regulate and coordinate 
the activities of non-governmental organisations (NGOs) in the Boko Haram-ravaged region of 
the country.19 Though not yet passed into law, the above draft statutes generated heated 
discontent across the polity, sparking protests by civil society movements determined to block 
their passage. The bills were resisted not only because of their inconsistency with local and 
international laws protecting the freedom of speech and association but also because of their 
potential to supress free communication of views and limit the capability of citizens and 
organizations to challenge overreaching state behaviour.  
Whilst the real motives driving the government’s impulse to fashion restrictive regulations are 
certainly not disclosed, it is clear that restrictive legislations principally seek to curtail organized 
assemblies and dissenting voices that challenge the status quo. Since non-profit organizations 
(NPOs), especially the non-governmental organisations (NGOs) often take the lead in initiating 
and coordinating varying forms of organized dissent, that probably explains the increasing use of 
legislative measures to target, suppress and/or limit their activities. Particularly significant to the 
civil society sector are legal regimes enforced in furtherance of anti-money (AML) laundering and 
countering financing of terrorism (CFT) measures. AML and CFT measures derive inspiration 
from international financial regulations like the Financial Action Task Force (“FATF”). The Money 
Laundering (Prohibition) Act 2011, the Terrorism (Prevention) Act No. 10, 2011 as amended, the 
Special Control Unit against Money Laundering (“SCUML”) Regulations 2013 and 2016, and the 
Central Bank of Nigeria AML/CFT Guidelines 2013 are some of the major national legislations 
enacted in response to FATF promptings.   
Domestic efforts to comply with international standards like the FATF may have opened the door 
for human rights abuses, by providing governments with security-based grounds to crush dissent 
and impose restrictions on civil society.20 Along this line, state actors have occasionally quoted 
AML and CFT refrains in their altercations with local and international NGOs. AML/CFT 
buzzwords have also been advanced to support the closure of humanitarian organizations after 
linking their operations with terrorism. For instance, Action Against Hunger’s main offices in Borno 
and Yobe States21, north-eastern Nigeria was closed on September 18, 2019, following an 
accusation of “aiding and abetting” Boko Haram, a terrorist organization. The National Risk 
Assessment (NRA) (completed in 2016) identified Designated Non-Financial Businesses and 
Institutions (DNFIs), of which NPOs are a subset, as being amongst those sectors most 
vulnerable to money laundering (ML) and terrorist financing (TF). This postulation strives to lay 
the foundation for the imposition of stringent regulatory controls on the activities of NPOs. Despite 
the surging restrictions, so few national level activists and organizations are aware of the FATF, 
 
19 See Borno State Agency for Coordination of Sustainable Development and Humanitarian Response Bill 
20 See Closing Spaces Database: AML/CFT category, https://closingspaces.org/category/anti-money-laundering-counter-financing-
of-terrorism/  
21 Action Against Hunger, Nigeria: Following Forced Closure Of Offices in Borno and Yobe States, Action Against Hunger 





let alone know how compliance or instrumentalization of FATF by states fosters over-regulation, 
whether unintentional or spurious. (OHAERI V.I:2020).22  
- Overbroad application of existing laws 
Under the second category, certain state and federal laws have been applied so broadly beyond 
the original intendment of the law in order to justify crackdowns on civil society or to supress 
criticisms directed against those in power. (OHAERI V.I: 2017).23 Here, existing laws are 
interpreted and enforced in a manner that casts the net so wide to catch all possible offenders of 
serious and not-so-serious misdemeanours.  For instance, Nigeria’s 2015 Cybercrime Law was 
enacted to create a legal, regulatory and institutional framework for improving cybersecurity and 
to ensure the protection of the critical national information infrastructure. State officials invoked 
this law to legitimize the arrests of Abubakar Sidiq Usman24 and Musa Babale Azare in 2016. 
More recently, Joseph Odok25, Ambrose Nwaogwugwu26 and Emperor Ogbonna27 were charged 
with terrorism on account of Facebook posts that were critical of state executives. In all of these 
cases, state prosecutors relied on the provisions of the Cybercrimes (Prohibition etc.) Act of 2015.  
Overwhelming evidence from the Closing Spaces Database shows that bloggers and active 
citizens are the primary targets of the overbroad application of existing regulations. A lot of the 
charges of terrorism and cyberstalking brought pursuant to the federal cybercrimes legislation are 
linked to commentary posted on social media. With astonishing consistency, the Department of 
State Security (DSS) is the chief state actor using the cybercrime law as a weapon to facilitate 
the arrest and prosecution of vocal critics, bloggers and social media commentators. The growing 
body of evidence linking social media commentary and state persecution corroborates Closing 
Spaces Database’ analytics which found that the freedom of expression—comprising press 
freedom (63 incidents) and the freedom of speech (53 incidents)—bear the highest share of 
repressive activities in the Nigerian civic environment (SPACES FOR CHANGE [S4C]: 2020).28  
The increasing use of the cybercrime law as a weapon to target critics is a plausible pointer to the 
actual motivation for the unrelenting official attempts to introduce legislations that have such 
sweep to regulate the social media and civil society groups.  
 
22 Victoria Ibezim-Ohaeri, FATF and Civic Space: Lessons from Nigeria, NPO Coalition on FATF, July 2020: 
https://fatfplatform.org/stories/fatf-and-civic-space-lessons-from-nigeria/ 
23 Victoria Ibezim-Ohaeri, Confronting Closing Civic Spaces in Nigeria, Issue 26, SUR International Journal on Human Rights,   
September 2017: page 1; https://sur.conectas.org/en/confronting-closing-civic-spaces-in-nigeria/  
24 BBC: Nigeria Anger Over Blogger Abubakar Sidiq Usman's Arrest, 9 August 2016, 
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-37024062 
25 Closing Spaces Database, Nigerian Lawyer Slammed with Terrorism Charges for Criticising State Governor, 
Please see: https://closingspaces.org/incident/nigerian-lawyer-slammed-with-terrorism-charges-for-criticising-state-
governor/ 
26 Closing Spaces Database, At Last, PDP New Media DG, Nwaogwugwu Granted Bail In High Court, , 
https://closingspaces.org/incident/at-last-pdp-new-media-dg-nwaogwugwu-granted-bail-in-high-court/ 
27 TV360: 70 Days in Custody; The Case of Emperor Ogbonna, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-
7AIhPYzCOY&feature=youtu.be 
28 SPACES FOR CHANGE, Database of Closing Civic Spaces in Nigeria: An Independent Review, August 




- Non-legal restrictions 
 
This category of restrictions usually takes the form of shaming, negative labelling and including 
the outright proscription of the activities of targeted activists and groups. In July 2019, a federal 
court granted the government’s request to proscribe the Islamic Movement of Nigeria (IMN) and 
label them a "terrorist" organisation.29 IMN members have continued to protest the prolonged 
incarceration of their leader since 2015 despite several court orders for his release. In the same 
vein, the government proscribed the non-violent secessionist campaigns of the Indigenous People 
of Biafra, IPOB. Hundreds of their members have been allegedly killed by security forces and their 
leader, Nnamdi Kanu, forced into exile. The proscription of the Indigenous People of Biafra and 
the Islamic Movement of Nigeria as terrorist organizations underscores the governments revulsion 
toward organized dissent powered by religious and ethnic inclinations. Proscribing the activities 
of these groups for the most part, lays the foundation for plastering terrorist labels on them, 
thereby emboldening state actors to clamp down harder on their activities. 
 
Negative rhetoric has also been used to stifle political opposition, stigmatise activists and to smear 
sections of civil society. For instance, the Closing Spaces Database records 16 incidents of 
perceived politically-motivated attacks and prosecutions on opposition politicians (and their family 
members and allies), underscoring how political differences have become another driver of 
closing civic space in Nigeria. The Nigerian government arraigned popular politician, social critic 
and member of the opposition political party, Dino Melaye, twelve times in one year for a number 
of offences ranging from murder, corruption, and for some other unclear reasons. Similarly, 
myriad of objections have trailed the recent amendment of the Companies and Allied Matters Act, 
CAMA. Christian leaders and other vocal critics of the amended legislation have been accused of 
being corrupt and fearing accountability.30  Attacks of this nature unleashed on opposition political 
leaders and civil society actors have the effect of delegitimizing their agitations for good 
governance, mobilizing public hatred toward them or to increase their vulnerability to stigma and 
ridicule. Another consequence is declining public trust and confidence in that person so labelled, 
and by implication, the civil society as a whole.31 
 
COVID-19 AND THE CIVIC SPACE IN NIGERIA 
No country in the world expected the pandemic and the resulting health crisis. The sudden 
outbreak of the scourge forced countries, including Nigeria, to take charge and make difficult 
choices to contain disease spread. Emergency regulations were hurriedly passed across Nigerian 
states and at the federal level which severely limited certain rights and freedoms. Lagos State, 
for instance, enacted the Lagos State Infectious Diseases (Emergency Prevention) Regulations 
2020 on the 27th day of March 2020, while the Federal Government passed the COVID-19 
Regulations 2020 three days later. Calls for the repeal of the outdated legislations like the Federal 
Quarantine Act culminated in the introduction of two proposed federal statutes sharing 
substantially similar provisions, called National Emergency Health Bill, and the Control of 
Infectious Diseases Bill. Although the two bills aim to enlarge governmental powers to manage 
and control the spread of infectious diseases like COVID-19, the restrictive nature of some of the 
 
29 Aljzeera News, Nigeria to Label Shia Group a 'Terrorist Organisation, 27 Jul 2019, 
https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/07/nigeria-label-shia-group-terrorist-organisation-190727172937653.html 
30 THISDAYLIVE, Fearing Accountability, CAN Steps Up Agitation against CAMA, September 2, 2020: 
https://www.thisdaylive.com/index.php/2020/09/02/fearing-accountability-can-steps-up-agitation-against-cama/ 




provisions provoked public outrage, with many groups32 denouncing their frightening 
implications for civil liberties.  
The flurry of regulations enacted in the wake of the pandemic stipulated adherence to lockdowns, 
social distancing and other health and safety protocols. Compared to countries in the global north, 
the lockdown measures appear to have been successful in keeping coronavirus infections and 
death rates low. While some states adopted harsher methods to enforce the containment 
measures, some others embraced less stringent means to enhance compliance. The Database 
of Closing Civic Spaces tracked numerous incidents of high-handedness or the use of 
disproportionate force against civilians (leading to injury and deaths) by security operatives 
enforcing the lockdown measures. Corroborating the above records, a press statement of the 
National Human Rights Commission (NHRC)33, also reported 11 deaths resulting from extra-
judicial killings in different parts of the country. Out of the 11 deaths, the Nigeria Police Force was 
responsible for 7 deaths. Other types of violations recorded within the period include 34 incidents 
of torture, inhumane and degrading treatment, 14 incidents of violation of right to freedom of 
movement, unlawful arrest and detention, 11 incidents of seizure/confiscation of properties and 
19 incidents of extortion, Again, the Nigeria Police Force accounted for 59.6% of the total cases 
of violations.  
For countries like Mali, Chad, Nigeria and Niger in the Sahel region, the pandemic appeared to 
have exacerbated existing security challenges. The endemic conflict not only left many in need 
of humanitarian aid, but also caused governments to take measures that limited humanitarian 
agencies from operating freely in those areas, preventing help from reaching those in critical 
need. Skirmishes in Southern Kaduna between Christian famer-minorities and the pastoralist 
Muslims escalated, leaving fatalities on both sides. Perception is growing that COVID-19 and the 
associated 24hour curfew might be preventing attacked communities from organizing themselves 
to repel attacks. Security agents have also been blamed for their gross inaction and slow response 
to security emergencies.  
By authorizing security operatives to use force, including military action,34 to enforce the 
emergency measures, state actors are ostensibly treating the pandemic—not just as a public 
health crisis—but as a security issue. Though this approach provides the speed and toughness 
needed to take decisions, the securitization of emergency measures has far-reaching implications 
for the civic space. For many citizens, the appearance of police and army patrols roaming the 
streets, mounting roadblocks and checkpoints, prohibiting inter-state travels, banning public 
protests and gatherings, plus the unprecedented number of arrests and detentions of citizens 
recorded, are reminiscent of the military regimes of the 80s and 90s when the civic space was 
completely closed. The repressive effects on the civic space are also magnifying other 
unintended consequences of the COVID-19 emergency responses such as income losses, 
job losses, hunger, unemployment, insecurity and homelessness. The brewing tension 
between  COVID-19 responses and constitutionally-protected civil liberties have led 
 
32 Fund for Global Human Rights: Nigerian Civil Society Pushes Back On Draconian Disease Bill, May 2020: 
https://globalhumanrights.org/blogs/nigerian-civil-society-pushes-back-on-draconian-disease-bill/  
33 National Human Rights Commission press release: Report of Alleged Human Rights Violations Recorded 
Between 13th April to 4th May, 2020 Following the Extension of the Lockdown Period, May 2020: 
https://www.nigeriarights.gov.ng/nhrc-media/press-release/104-report-of-alleged-human-rights-violations-recorded-
between-13th-april-to-4th-may-2020-following-the-extension-of-the-lockdown-period.html  
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commentators35 and groups to conclude that the disease containment measures are reinforcing 
fears of deliberate governmental clampdowns on civic freedoms using COVID-19 as an excuse 
[S4C:2020].36  
- Patterns of COVID-19 restrictions on the civic space 
From the above, three notable patterns of exploitation of emergency powers have been observed. 
The first is the securitization of heath emergency responses. The shoot-at-sight directives to 
security operatives to shoot any person that tries to escape from quarantine and isolation 
centers,37 deploying maximum force including military action to enforce compliance with safety 
protocols—such as wearing of face masks, social distancing and ban on public gatherings—
compounded by the  overzealous conduct of security forces during the lockdown evince how 
securitized emergency measures are causing unwarranted fatalities, violating human rights and 
shrinking the civic space. The spikes in arrests, extortions and detentions further establish that 
police officers discountenanced official directives barring them from detaining suspects for minor 
offences during the lockdown. The enforcement of public safety measures by security forces have 
inadvertently aided the increase of wrongful arrests, detention of citizens, including denying 
victims the right to legal representation, timely and fair hearing and ultimately, access to justice. 
Although the government is incrementally easing the lockdown measures, the sledgehammer 
approach adopted by law enforcement agents are also propelling limitations on free speech and 
free assemblies. These limitations have stretched from the arrests of journalists over their 
journalistic duties to the victimization of citizens for engaging in sensitive rhetoric.  A case in point 
is the continued detention of popular Nigerian atheist, Mubarak Bala, a prominent humanist and 
atheist. Since his arrest in April, he is still being held on account of a Facebook post where he 
stated his reservations about Prophet Muhammad. Harsher policing operations also resulted in 
the arrest of over 40 #RevolutionNow protesters demanding good governance in the country.  
The second pattern of misuse of emergency powers manifests in the form of executive and 
regulatory overreach.  The pandemic provided a trigger for the tidal wave of hastily-enacted health 
regulations containing numerous provisions that restrict civic freedoms and narrow the space for 
civic action. Critical policy decisions were hurriedly made with very minimal consultation and 
involvement of the civil society and other critical sectors. Without such broad consultation, the 
disparate health needs, prejudices and biases prevalent in a multi-cultural, multi-ethnic and plural 
environment, are often overlooked. Not only that, whilst border and airspace closures fall within 
the realm of federal jurisdiction, numerous state governors closed their states’ waterways, air and 
land borders, which includes prohibition of inter-state/inter-town travels, except for essential 
services. In other words, state governors were invoking the doctrine of necessity to exercise 
powers ungranted by the constitution in the name of containing the spread of coronavirus.38 Travel 
and movement bans particularly interfered with the organisation of public demonstrations and 
also hampered the ability of lawyers to provide legal services for clients in faraway locations and 
 
35 Victoria Ibezim-Ohaeri, COVID-19: The Legality and Limits of the President’s Emergency Powers, Premium 
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informal communities. These approaches adopted by state governors across the country fuel 
fears that emergency measures are being repurposed to further close space for civil society.  
The third trend to note is the political friction arising from the conflicting regulations enacted at the 
federal and state levels for the handling of the pandemic39 with the result that citizens and 
corporate entities adhering to federal regulations have been found to be acting in contravention 
of state regulations.  Scores have been arrested, detained and prosecuted40 despite these 
contradictions. Nothing illustrates the state-federal regulatory divergence more than the Rivers 
State Government versus Caverton and Exxon Mobil saga. Paragraph 8 of Rivers State 
Quarantine (Coronavirus and Infectious Diseases) Regulation, 2020 suspends flight operations 
and prohibits persons landing at the airports in the state to transit into or through the state to any 
neighbouring state. Relying on the essential service exemptions granted to petroleum distribution 
and retail companies under Regulation 1(6) of the Federal COVID-19 Regulations 2020, the 
Caverton Group, a private helicopter service company that renders flight support to oil companies 
obtained a counter approval from the federal aviation minister to fly passengers engaged in 
essential services in the oil and gas industry. Caverton’s pilots and passengers were arrested and 
remanded in custody when they flew into the airport in River State in contravention of the state’s 
COVID-19 regulations. Where more than one law governs a violation, it occasions jurisdiction 
cherry-picking and confusion regarding which law should be applied to defaulters. Also, the 
multiplicity of regulations emboldens state and federal actors to cast their nets so wide to catch 
more defaulters of COVID-19 regulations, increasing their eligibility for harsher punishment. 
 
• Civil Society Responses to Shrinking Civic Space in Nigeria 
Across the globe, the work of charities, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and 
humanitarian groups—all often regarded as non-profit organizations (NPOs)—have gained 
tremendous traction over time and space. In Nigeria, NPOs form part of the broader civil society, 
operating in various forms such as social movements, student unions and nationalists engaged 
in pro-independence struggles. They carry out different kinds of good works, with their activities 
reaching millions of people, particularly in the areas of education, health, security, agriculture, 
policy formulation, democracy, governance, gender rights, public rights advocacy, and so forth. 
(SPACES FOR CHANGE: 2019).41 So huge is the non-profit sector that it garnered over $13.85 
Billion in foreign financial inflows to the Nigerian economy between 2015 and 2016.42 
 
Non-profit entities in Nigeria operate mainly as local or international non-governmental 
organization (INGOs), depending on the nature of their registration, the scale and reach of their 
operations and the type of work they engage in. Foreign non-profit organizations, mainly 
comprising the INGOs are mandated to register with the Federal Ministry of Budget and National 
Planning (FMBNP). On the other hand, national level organizations mainly register with the 
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Corporate Affairs Commission, CAC, either as incorporated trustees or companies limited by 
guarantee. Some others operating at the grassroots register as community-based organizations 
at the state and local government levels.43 
 
Long before COVID-19, civil society actors deployed a wide range of strategies to confront the 
upswing in governmental restrictions on human and corporate freedoms. At the time, state actors 
often justified restrictions on the civic space, citing national interest or national security reasons. 
The result was the exercise of governmental power in ways that considerably repressed human 
freedoms and contracted the spaces for civic engagement, resulting in many arrests, detentions 
and prosecutions.  Groups like Spaces for Change (S4C) and the Policy and Legal Advocacy 
Center (PLAC) take the lead in patrolling and analysing legislations with restrictive elements to 
gauge their consistency with national interest considerations. Because understanding the 
provisions of the proposed restrictive statutes is necessary to empower advocates to push back 
and confront the restrictions headlong, S4C and PLAC routinely leverage on their convening 
power to sensitize and galvanize civil society advocates to interrogate legislative prescriptions 
considered too restrictive.  
Collaborative initiatives were also popular. For instance, the Action Group on Free Civic Space 
built solidarity to ensure that government regulations (framed around national security, anti-money 
laundering (AML) and countering terrorism financing (CFT)) do not shrink civic space. Within a 
short time, the coalition grew in strength in numbers, shared expertise and research and built 
capacity amongst individual activists/bloggers, and created good working relationships with 
national and international AML/CFT regulators.44 The Civil Society Situation Room45 has been 
conducting training sessions for civil society groups and election observers, increasing their ability 
to monitor violations of electoral guidelines, incident reporting on election days, as well as how to 
use the deployment and observation checklists. In this way, citizens’ rights to associate and 
assembly freely, as well as participate in political governance processes are continuously checked 
and monitored for restrictions. 
 
Other examples of collaborative civil society responses to push back on restrictions on the civic 
space are chronicled below: 
 
Timeline of restrictive triggers and collaborative responses:46 
→  2015 – Anti-Social Media Bill is proposed by the government; an informal network of CSOs 
respond collectively – the Bill is defeated  
→  2016 – NGO Bill is tabled by the government; an informal network collaborates again via 
research and advocacy; the Bill is defeated  
→  2016/17/18 - Anti-money laundering measures are used to target activists and CSOs; direct 
engagement is required with regulators, and collaboration begins to crystallise around this work  
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→  2019 - The scheduling of a national evaluation on AML/CFT measures triggers the need for a 
sector-wide response from civil society, and the Action Group formalises to carry out this work.  
 
Knowledge-sharing initiatives like the Closing Spaces Database provide the raw material and 
evidence actors need to frame and inform their strategies and interventions. The database has 
been tracking and documenting crackdowns on the civic space in Nigeria and West Africa. It 
began by tracking incidents in Nigeria from 2015, and extended coverage to the West African 
sub-region in 2017. The database represents the first step in combating restrictions on the civic 
space, by identifying and demonstrating the manner, tactics, and extent state actors and their 
collaborators are limiting civic expression and participation in governance.  
• How Civil Society Actors Responded to COVID-19 Shocks on the Civic Space 
 
- Digital assemblies 
For the civil society community, the pandemic-induced disruptions to the traditional forms of 
organizing equally brought many positives. The Coronavirus may have interfered with the 
organisation of public demonstrations, street actions and formal events such as conferences, 
workshops and seminars, but civil society actors and activists adapted to the disruptions by 
leveraging on advancements in digital technology to achieve their social justice agendas.  Some 
organizations are taking advantage of internet trends and hashtags to raise public awareness, 
converge for digital protests, demand action on issues and speak truth to authorities. For instance, 
Twitter-fuelled protests against the intimidation of a female rape victim spurred a wide range of 
discourse online and offline, forcing authorities to intervene and probe the rape allegation 
involving a celebrity. Almost 15,000 individuals signed a petition demanding the United Nations 
to strip the popular singer of his ambassadorship endorsement, signalling cancel culture as a 
developing form of protest on social media. 
Subsequent events demonstrate that the cancel culture has come to stay, and now forms an 
integral part of civic space activism in Nigeria. In August, a fierce Twitter campaign triggered the 
disinvitation of Kaduna Governor El-Rufai as a keynote speaker at the 60th Annual General 
Conference of the Nigerian Bar Association (NBA), the statutory body of all lawyers called to 
practice law in Nigeria. Within hours the campaign kicked off on social media, no fewer than 3,000 
lawyers47 signed the petition asking the  NBA to withdraw the invitation. The campaign came on 
the heels of the governor’s odious human rights records and notoriety for disobedience to court 
orders, coupled with his alleged poor handling of the unceasing bloodletting in Southern Kaduna. 
Tensions over land rights and religious differences between agrarian and pastoral communities, 
Muslim and non-Muslim populations, form the major background of the seasonal conflicts in 
Southern Kaduna that have spanned several decades. However, a fresh and ongoing wave of 
violence amid the pandemic is fuelling new conversations about the perceived bias of the Kaduna 
State government against the Christian minority populations in the region, including the 
complacency and complicity of both the Federal and State government in responding to the 
humanitarian crisis resulting in hundreds of deaths, loss of properties and mass displacements of 
thousands of natives. 
- Incident tracking and analysis: 
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For some other organizations, the pandemic presented an opportunity to scale up the tracking 
and documentation of atrocities and violations of civic freedoms. For instance, both the Closing 
Spaces Database and the NHRC documented numerous incidents of violations perpetrated by 
the Nigerian Police Force enforcing COVID-19 lockdown measures. Global Rights’48 tracking of 
casualties of conflicts, violent clashes and extrajudicial killings also heightened the tracking of 
violence-related deaths across the country. The evidence generated from these knowledge-
building initiatives served as springboards engendering other forms of policy and advocacy action. 
For instance, prompted by S4C’s petition,49 based on its incident tracking, the National Human 
Rights Commission launched an investigation into a killing of a civilian by military officers 
enforcing the lockdown in Delta State.  
 
- Collaborative initiatives  
The pandemic also forced changes in the way civil society actors work in terms of strategy and 
results. The organizations taking on civic space issues sometimes work in silos, and reinvent the 
wheel. The movement restrictions necessitated rights groups, active citizens and activists to 
expand on new strategies, working more collaboratively and maximizing scale of impact. In a 
concerted effort to ensure that restrictive emergency measures are not exploited to clamp down 
on civil liberties, six member organizations of the Action Group on Free Civic Space—namely 
Spaces for Change (S4C), CLEEN Foundation, NOPRIN Foundation, Rule of Law and 
Accountability Advocacy Center (RULAAC), JDPC Gowon Estate and the Network of Pro Bono 
Lawyers of Nigeria—launched Legal Helplines50 to offer free legal services to persons whose 
rights are violated as a result of the COVID-19 lockdown measures in Nigeria. The legal 
departments of the six organizations teamed up, combined their legal resources to build a pool of 
attorneys ready to intervene and secure justice for the aggrieved.  
The Action Group’s team of lawyers received complaints of human rights violations arising from 
the lockdown measures from any part of the country and provided free legal services, including 
securing police bails, providing on-the-spot legal advice, free legal representation in courts, and 
petitioning agencies and institutions responsible for redressing wrongs. With each group playing 
different roles according to their areas of strength, this allowed for the complementarity of skills, 
and for deepening the bonds of solidarity among local stakeholders as they maximise the use of 
existing spaces to organise and collectively respond to threats. 
- North-south exchanges 
In particular, the pandemic brought to the fore, the imperativeness of locally-rooted responses 
during a health emergency.  Distrust of government authority in some countries means there is 
also a credibility gap that could inhibit state-led prevention and mitigation. Local groups earn deep 
community trust, which means they can assist populations that governments may not be able to 
effectively reach.51 Leveraging on the trust and strong presence of local actors at the frontlines, 
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synergies and cross country collaborations between organizations in the global north and south 
gained ground during the pandemic. Synergies developed including support for national 
organizations transcends financial support, but also encompasses other in-kind currency such as 
research partnerships, capacity-building, technical assistance, solidarity, amplification of local 
voices through news/report mentions, speaking engagements, co-convenings and so forth. The 
deepening of connections and exchanges between actors across jurisdictions not only expanded 
opportunities for southern perspectives to be reflected in global discussions affecting the civic 
space, but also enabled them to contribute to high-level dialogues with both intergovernmental 
and supranational traits.52  
• New entrants in the civic space arena 
The emergence of new, active actors on the civic space arena is a very interesting dimension to 
the current realities unleashed by the pandemic. Prominent on this list are health workers, lawyers 
and medical associations, teachers’ unions, senior judicial officers, pensioners, state attorney 
generals, corporate establishments and many more. With this new trend, activism is no longer 
the exclusive reserve of civil society and media advocates, but a wider group of private actors 
and associational bodies campaigning extensively online and offline against varying injustices 
and restrictions, including demanding better welfare for their members. In April, health 
professionals in Akwa-Ibom State, clashed with the state government, demanding improvements 
in healthcare infrastructure in the state, and the welfare of medical personnels.  Just weeks ago, 
the Nigeria Bar Association bowed to social media pressure and waded into the case of Yahaya 
Sharif-Aminu, the Kano singer recently sentenced to death by the Kano Upper Sharia Court for 
blasphemy. He has been denied access to his lawyers, preventing him from appealing the death 
sentence within the statutory time allowed by law. The significant increase in citizen and mass-
based actions and the growing culture of digitivism in Nigeria reflect the shared aspirations of 
citizens to keep the civic space free from obstructions, and ensure all duty-bearers are held 
accountable.  
CONCLUSION: 
While COVID19 has birthed a number of challenges, it has also influenced civil society 
organisations to revise and develop more inclusive strategies, programming, and campaigns that 
deliver maximum impacts in light of pandemic realities. The use of powerful instruments like the 
social media platforms and conventional media to share, popularize, and discuss key advocacy 
messages have helped to put pressure on authorities to do what is right. Policies and statutory 
proposals considered by the parliament at this time are now being closely monitored, scrutinized, 
analysed and explained to public at greater speed and less cost.   Besides that, the move by civil 
society organisations to adopt cross collaboration as a method for demanding accountability from 
the government is also paying off.  All of these point to a collective will and resilience on the 
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